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I. INTRODUCTION
In April 1998, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) released a
consumer alert pertaining to the increasing problem of online auction fraud.
The consumer alert notified prospective online auction users that fraud was
becoming more prevalent as the number of online auction participants
burgeoned. The FTC, in the consumer alert, suggested tips that the
consumer should consider when bidding in an online auction. Since this
consumer alert, the online auction industry's awareness of fraud has grown
considerably. While the FTC has had limited success in policing the
auctions and bringing prosecutions of fraudulent merchants, little has been
done to address whether or not the provider of the online auction site
should be held accountable for providing the arena in which the fraudulent
practices occur.
Part II of this Note examines the online auction industry and the fraud
that is becoming all too commonplace. Statistical evidence clearly indicates
that online auction fraud is continuing to grow. Part II then identifies a
variety of different fraudulent practices that frequently occur in connection
with online auctions. While not an exhaustive list of all the different
possibilities of fraud, there is a representative group of practices that will
clearly indicate the creativity associated with online auction fraud. Faced
with the prospect of online auctions becoming a breeding ground for the
unscrupulous and ill willed, Part III of this Note is a detailed analysis of the
various efforts to stop online auction fraud. The online auction houses
themselves, as well as consumer protection groups, and the FTC have
undertaken efforts to curb fraudulent use of the online auction sites. Part IV
undertakes a comparative study between online auction fraud and the abuse
of the pay-per-call industry in the early 1990s. FTC officials warn that the
near demise of the 900-number industry due to fraudulent use could be a
foreshadowing of the fate of online auctions if the FTC does not promptly
address the fraud occurring online. In Part V, this Note ultimately
concludes that the existing efforts of online auction industry self-regulation
do not provide adequate recourse against the online auction houses for
fraudulent practices occurring on their Web sites. The only effective
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method to stop the increase of online auction fraud is for the FTC to
promulgate guidelines and standards that would put the industry on notice
that its members will be held responsible for future acts of online auction
fraud committed through the use of their Web site.
II. COMPLAINTS OF ONLNE AUCTION FPRAUD INCREASE AS THE
PERPETRATORS BECOME MORE CREATIVE
A. Statistical Evidence of the Increase in Online Auction Fraud
Nothing evinces the urgency of curtailing the spread of online auction
fraud more than the increase in complaints over the past three years. Both
the FTC and the Interet Fraud Watch (IFW), operated by the National
Consumers League (NCL), serve as reporting agencies for consumer
complaints pertaining to fraud.
According to Lisa Hone, staff attorney for the FTC, using Internet-
based auctions to defraud people is "'a new type of crime.'"' "Hone said
that in the first half of 1998, the FTC's Bureau of Consumer Protection
received about [three hundred] complaints involving online auction fraud.' 2
In the first half of 1999, the FTC's Bureau recorded about six thousand
3complaints. This represents a two thousand percent increase in just one
year's time.
According to Susan Grant, director of the IFW project, the number of
reports alleging auction fraud are increasing at its offices as well.
4
Consumer complaints to the IFW regarding online auctions increased 600%
from 1997 to 1998.5 In 1997, constituting 26% of the total frauds reported,
auctions were the number one Internet fraud complaint.6 While online
auctions maintained the number one ranking in 1998, the percentage of
reports pertaining to auctions increased to an alarming 68%.7 This 68%
represents nearly 5500 consumer complaints about fraudulent practices
occurring on an online auction site.8 In 1998, approximately two-thirds of
1. Marilyn Geewax, Swindlers Cash in with Net Auctions, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct.
24, 1999, at A9.
2. Id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See Internet Fraud Watch, Going Once, Going Twice .. .Scammedt Online
Auctions Named the Number One Internet Fraud Complaint for 1998 (visited Jan. 18, 2000)
<http://www.fraud.orgintemet/9923stat.htm> [hereinafter Scammed.q.
6. See id,
7. See id.
8. See Mo Krochmal, Bidding Frenzy: What You Need to Know About Internet
Auctions (visited Jan. 18, 2000) <.http:/lwww.netguide.com/SnapshottArchive?guide
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all Internet-related complaints to the IFW involved auctions and, as of
October 1999, 90% of consumer complaints to the TFW pertain to
auctions.
The increase in the number of complaints can be attributed to several
factors. As the number of Web sites devoted to online auctions increases, it
is predictable that the number of frauds occurring on those Web sites will
likewise increase. Currently, well over one hundred online auction sites are
dedicated to bringing together consumers with other consumers as well as
businesses with consumers.'0
eBay, one of the most popular sites on the Internet, accommodated
more than 6.5 million unique visitors in February 1999." With traffic this
heavy, eBay was able to consummate more than one million auctions per
12day on a consumer-to-consumer basis. eBay officials maintain that
problems with fraud are extremely rare.13 eBay reports that only twenty-
seven of the more than one million auctions per day generate a fraud
complaint to the company.14 This equals nearly ten thousand fraudulent
transactions per year. More generally, in 1998, online auction sites
accounted for auction sales amounting to roughly two billion dollars, and
analysts expect that by the end of next year that figure will more than
triple.
5
Another factor that explains the increase in fraud associated with
online auctions is the lack of adequate external law enforcement. As the
number of sites offering online auction services increases, there is a
commensurate rise in the need for better policies. However, one of the
difficulties in stopping fraudulent activities and outright theft is that
auctions have grown far more quickly than law enforcement budgets."
Regardless of the reason for the increase in the number of consumer
complaints pertaining to online auction fraud, it is clear that someone must
take the steps necessary to thwart the spread of this new crime. With
external resources already stretched thin, a more appropriate and efficient
=Shopping&id=1600>.
9. See Geewax, supra note 1, at A9.
10. See Krochmal, supra note 8. eBay and Amazon.com represent the most popular
online auction sites providing the arena for consumer-to-consumer auctions. Meanwhile, for
business-to-consumer auctions, the most frequently visited sites are Onsale.com and
uBid.com. See id.
11. See icL
12. See id.
13. See George Anders, How eBay Will Battle Sham Bids, Mislabeling of Auction
Goods, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 1999, at B1.
14. See id.
15. See Geewax, supra note 1, at A9.
16. See iL
[VoL. 52
ONLINEAUCTION FRAUD
method of enforcement would be to require the Web site operator to police
its users. Requiring the online auction houses financially liable for
fraudulent actions occurring through the perpetrator's use of their Web site
is the only way to impact the online auction houses.
B. Online Auction Fraud: How Does It Happen?
Fraudulent practices can occur during two distinct phases of the
online auction process. First, the fraud can take place during the actual
bidding process. Two types of fraud at this stage are bid shielding and bid
shilling. 7 Second, the fraud can occur after the auction has ended with a
buyer having made a winning bid. Three methods are commonly used to
perpetrate this fraud. The buyers may send payment to the seller and
receive no merchandise at all. The buyers may send payment to the seller
and receive inferior or completely different merchandise. Finally, the buyer
may win the auction but never send any payment.
1. Fraud During the Bidding Process
Bid shilling occurs when "an individual schemes with someone else
or creates a false identity in order to drive up the bidding prices on behalf
of the seller.'.. The effect of this fraudulent practice is to artificially
encourage legitimate bidders to continually increase their bid in an effort to
win the auction. Many times the individual creating a false identity is the
seller who then bids on its own merchandise in an effort to increase the
overall price received for the goods.
Bid shielding takes place when a buyer and a partner artificially
inflate the bids during an auction.'9 Unlike bid shilling, which hopes to
encourage increasingly higher bids, this scheme of bid inflation is intended
to discourage other bidders from bidding because the false bid is set at an
unusually high level. Then, at the last moment before the auction ends, the
shielder, who is the high bidder, cancels its high bid whereby his/her
partner wins the auction with the lower bid.20 For example, Bidder A bids
five dollars for merchandise being auctioned, while Bidder A's partner,
Bidder B, bids five-hundred dollars for the same merchandise. This high
bid discourages any other honest bidders from participating in the auction.
Then, just before expiration of the auction, Bidder B withdraws his bid,
leaving Bidder A as the high bidder with a bid of only five dollars.
17. utrade.com, utrade Online Aucntion-Fraud Policy Page (visited Oct. 29, 1999)
<http:lwww.utrade.comluser/fraud.htm?AssociatelD=2500>.
18. id.
19. See id
20. See id.
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2. Fraud After the Close of the Auction
The winning bidder sending payment to the seller and receiving
nothing in return is the most common type of fraud occurring after the
close of an auction. Some online sellers have put items up for auction,
taken the highest bidder's money, and never delivered the merchandise. In
addition, consumers who paid by certified check or money order have little
21
recourse when it comes to getting their money back. With fraudulent
online auction users recognizing the difficulty in retrieving a check or
money order, it is not surprising that payment by check or money order
accounts for ninety-three percent of fraudulent payments.m In other words,
as Susan Grants proclaims: "'Requesting cash is a clear sign of fraud."'
'2
The FTC alleged that Craig Lee Hare perpetrated this type of fraudulent
practice on successful bidders for his advertised computer hardware and
software. After the successful bidder mailed his check/money order to
Hare, Hare sent nothing in return.24
Another form of postauction fraud occurs when the high bidder mails
payment to the seller only to have the seller send either different
merchandise or merchandise of lower quality to the bidder' While the
bidder receives some merchandise, the goods the consumer receives are
usually of such poor quality that the purchase is virtually worthless. The
FTC also alleged this form of merchandise switching as part of its
complaint against Hare.26
One final form of fraud that occurs after the close of an auction is
when the successful bidder fails to send any payment to the seller. It is not
unheard of for the high bidder in an auction to walk away from the offer
and refuse to complete the transaction.2 7 While the direct cost of these
frauds is not as apparent as frauds involving payment made for either
nothing or inferior goods, the indirect effects are grave. The cost of having
to run an entirely new auction from scratch causes delay for the sellers in
their attempts to sell their goods. Furthermore, all disreputable actions cast
21. See FTC, FTC Consumer Alert! Online Auctions: Going, Going, Gone! (visited Jan.
18, 2000) <http:/lwww.ftc.govlbcp/Conlinelpubslalertslgonealrt.htm>.
22. See Scammed!, supra note 5.
23. IcL
24. See Complaint for Injunction and Other Equitable Relief, FrC v. Hare, Civil No.
98-8194 (D. Fla. 1998), available at (visited Jan. 18, 2000) <http:llwww.ftc.govl
osl1998198041comp13.htm>. For a more detailed discussion of this case, see infra Part ].C.
25. See Geewax, supra note 1, at A9.
26. See Complaint for Injunction and Other Equitable Relief, FTC v. Hare, Civil No.
98-8194 (D. Fla. 1998), available at (visited Jan. 18, 2000) <http:llwww.ftc.govl
osl1998198041Comp13.htm>.
27. See Anders, supra note 13, at B4.
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a cloud of distrust over the online auction system as a whole, thereby
undermining what little consumer confidence currently exists.
iH. VARIOUS PARTIES ARE ATrEMPTNG TO STOP ONLINE
AUCTION FRAUD
Efforts to prevent the continued proliferation of online auction fraud
come from many sources. Three specific groups are addressed below, each
having as a common goal the end of fraud, but all attempting to achieve
that goal through different means. Some of the approaches taken are
similar, while others are unique to the industry undertaking the effort. The
three groups consist of the online auction houses themselves, consumer
protection groups, and the FTC.
A. The Online Auction Houses' Efforts to Self-regulate
As Susan Grant stated, the auction hosts "'have a moral responsibility
to keep their sites from being used for fraud."'' The online auction
industry has taken steps to implement both industry-wide goals as well as
Web site-specific goals. While there is some overlap, it is worthwhile to
separate the overall goals of the industry from the specific efforts
individual Web site providers are implementing to combat Internet fraud.
I. Online Auction Industry Goals to Prevent Fraud
In response to the FTC's request for academic papers and public
comments on December 16, 1998,2 eBay submitted a paper to aid the FTC
in its consideration of the development of private sector measures to
effectively address consumer concerns about fraud." In this comment,
eBay succinctly identified desirable industry-wide goals for implementing
adequate safeguards to combat online fraud associated with auctions.
3
'
Electronic transactions in general, and auctions in particular, present
new consumer protection challenges for responsible firms.
eBay and other e-commerce businesses can meet that challenge by
developing creative programs to provide consumers with: (1) online
information to evaluate the safety and reliability of a transaction, (2)
targeted safeguards to protect against unscrupulous users, and (3)
28. Geewax, supra note 1, at A9.
29. See FrC, Public Workshop: U.S. Perspectives on Consumer Protection in the
Global Electronic Marketplace Notice, 63 Fed. Reg. 69,289 (1998).
30. See eBay, Inc. Comment, FTC v. Hare, Civil Action No. 98-8194 (S.D. Fla. 1998)
(visited Jan. 18, 2000) <http:/Iwww.ftc.gov/bcpicpw/ comments.ebay.htm> [hereinafter
eBay Comment]. eBay submitted this paper in response to the FTC's solicitation for
comments.
31. See EL
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easily comprehensible online programs and 3 policies designed
specifically to combat fraud, deception and misuse.
These goals are incredibly broad yet succinct enough to be considered
ambitious. They provide some guidance as to what individual members of
the online auction community should strive toward in an effort to stop
fraudulent practices.
2. Individual Web Site Efforts to Combat Fraud
eBay has been the most outspoken online auction house regarding its
efforts to curtail the spread of fraud on its Web site. While all of the
guidelines mentioned below are directly attributable to eBay, the general
scheme and overall policies are echoed throughout the industry. 3  In its
comments to the FTC, eBay declared its commitment to effective self-
regulation and to the proactive implementation of programs and policies to
empower and protect consumers.3 To achieve this empowerment, eBay, as
well as others on the inside and outside of the industry, continually echo• • 35
the same fraud prevention devices.
Soon after the founding of eBay, Pierre Omidyar, eBay's chairman,
developed a rating system to provide a feedback forum for auction users.
Members could submit short messages about one another, which are tallied
as positive or negative feedback and posted as a member's score. The
thinking behind this system was that "the desire to build up a good score-
and thus be known as a trustworthy trading partner-would be strong
enough" in each user that they would treat one another fairly.37 However,
the validity and value of the feedback system has been strained at times.
Some members have inflated their own scores by having their friends leave
favorable evaluations, even though they have never done business
together. Some members are sometimes apprehensive about leaving
negative feedback for fear that recipients would strike back with a negative
32. Id.
33. On the utrade.com website, the fraud policy is very explicit. While not being too
explanatory, the policy is simply zero tolerance. After investigating a complaint and the
allegations are found to be correct, its policy is to suspend the user on the first offense. The
website also maintains a blacklist to chronicle the errant users. utrade.com, supra note 17.
34. See eBay Comment, supra note 30.
35. Many articles and other information have been written either merely citing or even
applauding the efforts of eBay. See, e.g., Anders, supra note 13; Audri Lanford & Jim
Lanford, Internet ScamBusters Snippets (visited Jan. 18, 2000)
<http://www.scambusters.com/Scambusters28.htmI>.
36. See Anders, supra note 13, at B4.
37. Id.
38. See id.
[Vol. 52
ONLINEAUCTION FRAUD
comment, tarnishing their online reputation.39 In response to these
concerns, eBay is now changing its feedback system to only tally
comments relating to actual transactions.9
To proceed even further with consumer safeguards, eBay proposes the
following additional protections: (1) provide customers with free insurance
against fraud or mislabeling of goods with a twenty-five-dollar deductible
and two hundred dollars of coverage;41 (2) make it easier for customers to
take advantage of independent escrow services, especially for large
transactions;42 (3) allow users the option of having their identities verified
by an independent party, Equifax, Inc.;43 (4) ban sellers from bidding in
their auctions;-4 (5) establish stronger sanctions against bidders who win an
auction and then do not pay for the item;45 and (6) offer free mediation
services to eBay members for qualified disputes. 6
eBay has yet to enact these initiatives and their ultimate effectiveness
remains to be seen. The enumerated guidelines seem comprehensive and, if
fully and faithfully implemented, would aid in the prevention of online
auction fraud. The main concerns, however, are two-fold. First, some of the
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id. Lloyd's of London will underwrite the insurance on eBay. Consumers who
feel they were materially misled about what was for sale will submit claims to eBay. It will
then forward the claims to Lloyds if they seem valid. See id
42. See id. Currently, eBay offers online links to two escrow companies that will hold a
customer's payment until word is received that the goods have arrived safely. Fewer than
one percent of eBay customers use those service, regarding them as expensive and
cumbersome. See i
43. See id. Verification would result in a user then being certified on eBay as
"accredited." Users would pay five dollars and submit their driver's license and Social
Security numbers. The data would be kept private, but participants would be rewarded with
a special badge next to their names, indicating that their full identities had been verified. See
id.
44. See id. The company has historically allowed one such bid, because sellers claimed
to have friends who wanted to participate in an auction but were not online. With the
growing popularity of the Internet, though, that justification is fading. See id.
45. See id. In one embarrassing case, teenagers who submitted bids exceeding $100,000
with no intention of paying hijacked a charity auction sponsored by eBay. Company
officials say they will reprimand first-time offenders and will suspend users who repeatedly
make frivolous bids. See id.
46. See eBaV Comment, supra note 30. Disputes that qualify include receipt of damaged
items, disputes over the quality of merchandise and disputes over shipping or payment
terms. See id. One clear problem with mediation is that in the physical world, alternative
dispute resolution is conducted "in the shadow of the law." The threat of court or
governmental involvement is helpful in bringing parties to the table. In the online world,
dispute resolution is not conducted in the shadow of the law because national law throws
few shadows in cyberspace. See Ethan Katsh Comment, FTC v. Hare, Civil Action No. 98-
8194 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (visited Jan. 18, 1999) <http:llwww.ftc.govlbcpicpw/comments/
ethankatsh.htm>.
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prohibitions and resulting sanctions occur after the fraud has taken place.
Effective methods of prevention must be more proactive. Second, there is
no external regulatory structure to ensure that these policies are carried out
in a fair and consistent manner. Until eBay is faced with the threat of some
personal liability, there is no incentive for it to guarantee a fraud free
auction site.
B. Consumer Protection Groups' Efforts to Inform the Consumer
Numerous consumer protection groups have undertaken efforts to
provide as many Internet auction users as possible with basic information
to ensure their experience online is both profitable and enjoyable. The IFW
has been working directly with eBay and other online auction sites to
improve consumer safety and stop fraud.47
In addition to helping the online auction houses implement effective
fraud prevention policies, various consumer protection groups have
published tips intended to help the consumer stay one step ahead of the
48fraudulent auction user. The IFW has published nine comprehensive tips
that if followed should protect the average online auction user:41 (1)
"Understand how the auction works;"5 (2) "Check out the seller;"' (3) '3e
especially careful if the seller is a private individual;"5 (4) Confirm a
physical address and other identifying information;53 (5) "Ask about
delivery, returns, warranties[,] and service;'54 (6) "Be wary of claims about
55 56collectibles;" 5 (7) Use common sense as a guide; (8) "Pay the safest
47. See Scammed, supra note 5.
48. These consumer protection groups include the IFW, Internet ScamBusters, National
Fraud Information Center, and Better Business Bureau Online. Each group provides advice
for the consumer on how to avoid being susceptible to online auction fraud.
49. See Internet Fraud Watch, Online Auction Tips (visited Jan. 18, 2000)
<http://www.fraud.orglintemetlinttip/aucttip.htm> [hereinafter Auction Tips].
50. Id Many online auctions simply list items that people want to sell. They do not
verify if the merchandise actually exists or is described accurately.
51. Id. The auction site's feedback section provides valuable comments about the seller.
However, glowing reports could be "planted" by the seller, and a clean complaint record
does not guaranty that someone is legitimate.
52. l Most consumer protection laws and government agencies that enforce them do
not deal with private sales, so if there is a problem, it could be impossible to resolve.
53. See id The tips suggest that the buyer attempt to obtain the seller's name, street
address, and telephone number to research them or follow up if there is a problem. IFW
cautions the buyer about doing business with sellers who will not provide that information.
54. Id This site further suggests that the buyer obtain a definite delivery time, insist that
the shipment is insured, and ask about the return policy. If the buyer plans to purchase
electronic goods or appliances, IFW recommends inquiring about a warranty and how to get
service for the item.
55. Id IFW warns the potential buyer about any claims regarding the item given that it
is impossible to examine or appraise the item until after the sale. IFW advises that the buyer
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way;" ' and (9) "Let the auction site know if you have a problem.'58
This list of consumer advice is important and encourages online
auction users to obtain all relevant and helpful information available before
entering into any auction transaction. The online auction Web sites are also
attempting to craft fraud prevention procedures with an eye toward
furthering these consumer protection goals. However, pains involved in
addressing the millions of consumers and placing the consumers "on
guard" is both further removed and ultimately more cumbersome than a
comprehensive legal structure pointed directly at the limited number of
online auction site hosts.
C. The FTC's Efforts to Combat Online Auction Fraud
Eileen Harrington, Associate Director in the FTC's Bureau of
Consumer Protection, stated that the FTC pursues "its mission of
promoting the efficient functioning of the marketplace by seeking to
protect consumers from unfair or deceptive acts or practices and to promote
vigorous competition."59 The Federal Communication Commission (FCC)
believes it is important to address Internet fraud now, before it discourages
consumers from participating in the impressive commercial growth now in
progress on the Intemet.6 Consumers must feel confident that the Internet
is safe from fraud. Nothing is more likely to undermine consumer
confidence than exploitation by scam artists using this new technology as
yet another means to defraud consumers."
The FTC views protection from online auction fraud as the most
insist on a written statement describing the item and its value before paying for it.
56. See iL The buyer should ask if what the seller promises seems realistic; whether it
is this the best way to buy this item; and what is the most reasonable to bid for it.
57. Id. If the seller requests cash, this is a clear sign of fraud. If possible, the buyer
should pay by credit card because the charges may be disputed if the goods are
misrepresented or never arrive. Alternatively, the buyer could use an escrow agent, who acts
as a go-between to receive the merchandise and forward payment to the seller. Another
option is cash on delivery (COD). In addition, IFW states that the buyer could pay with a
check made out to the seller, as opposed the post office, so the buyer could stop payment if
necessary.
58. Id Some sites investigate problems like "shills" being used to bid prices up or other
abuses of the auction system. They may also want to know about sellers who do not deliver
or misrepresent their wares. A bad record may result in a seller being barred from using the
site again.
59. Consumer Protection in Cyberspace: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Telecomms., Trade, and Consumer Protection of the House Comm. on Commerce, 105th
Cong. 245 (1998) (prepared statement of Eileen Harrington, Associate Director in the
Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) [hereinafter Harrington Statement].
60. See id. at 246-47.
61. See Id.
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meaningful when three aspects are working together.62 First, law
enforcement must be coordinated against fraud and deception." Second,
private initiatives and public/private partnerships must cooperate and focus
on resolving the problem.64 Last, the FTC calls for consumer education
through the combined efforts of government, business, and consumer65
groups. Since the second and third aspects mirror the discussion in the
two earlier parts of this Note, the discussion of the FTC's efforts focuses
solely on its targeted law enforcement initiative.
The FTC has the authority to issue administrative complaints and
conduct administrative adjudications that may ultimately culminate in the
issuance of cease and desist orders against practices deemed to be unfair
and deceptive. 6 In addition, in cases involving fraud, the FTC has statutory
authority to file suit directly in federal district court to obtain preliminary
and permanent injunctive relief, redress for injured consumers, or
disgorgement of ill-gotten gains.67
In FTC v. Hare," the court issued a temporary restraining order and
froze the assets of an Internet merchant who used online auction houses to
offer merchandise but never delivered the goods to the consumers.69 Hare
used online auction houses to offer new and used computers for sale. After
successful bidders paid as much as $1450 per computer, Hare provided
them neither the computer nor a refund.70 The FTC alleged that Hare's
actions violated both the FTC Act and the Mail or Telephone Order
Merchandise Rule.71 The FTC Act bars "deceptive or misleading acts in
commerce," while the "Mail or Telephone Order Merchandise Rule
requires that sellers ship merchandise in a timely manner-a specified time
or [thirty] days-or offer to refund consumers' money.
' 72
FTC-initiated prosecutions are becoming increasingly common. With
the favorable result in Hare, it is clear that the FTC is capable of protecting
the consumer in some sense. However, civil actions brought against
individuals can only be so effective. Rather than investigating every
62 See id. at 245.
63. See iL
64. See id.
65. See iL
66. See id; 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994).
67. See id.; 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (1994).
68. Civil No. 98-8194 (D. Fla. 1998).
69. See FTC, FTC Halts Internet Auction House Scam (visited Jan. 18, 2000)
<http://www.ftc.gov/opal1998/9804/hare.htm>.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. Id.
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individual case of fraud, it would be much more efficient and ultimately
beneficial to the consumer if the FTC turned the focus of its attention on
the auction houses themselves. Making the auction houses responsible for
the fraudulent conduct would implore them to take all steps necessary to
protect the consumer.
IV. THE POTENTIALLY PERiLOUS FATE OF ONLINE AuCTIONS
IF IMMEDIATE ACTION Is NOT TAKEN
As demonstrated throughout this Note, the existing safeguards and
multiple proposed guidelines ultimately fail to attack the issue of online
auction fraud at its source. The individual auction house's self-regulation
attempts to solve the problem by setting up rarely used and cumbersome
programs that are only initiated if the consumer chooses. The consumer
protection groups have no real authority and only hope to educate the
consuming public. The FTC has limited resources and cannot afford to
prosecute every individual fraudulent online auction user. For obvious
reasons, these three lines of defense ultimately fail to provide the
consumers with the protection from fraud they should be entitled to expect.
The most efficient method available for stopping online auction fraud is to
establish liability with the one entity most capable of ending the fraudulent
practice: the online auction house.
As Eileen Harrington stated:
The Internet's promise of substantial consumer benefits is, however,
coupled with the potential for fraud and deception. Fraud operators are
always opportunists and are among the first to appreciate the potential
of a new technology. This phenomenon was illustrated by the advent,
flourishing, and near-demise of pay-per-call (900-number) technology
as a commercial medium during the last decade.
73
The same attributes that made pay-per-call services so attractive to
fraudulent users-low start-up costs and the potential for big profit-exist
on the Internet today.7 4 The FTC and FCC permitted the 900-number
industry to attempt self-regulation and only upon its failure did strict
regulations become necessary. A brief review of the near demise of the
pay-per-call industry will clearly illustrate the dangers of permitting
industry self-regulation regarding fraudulent use of the industry's services.
A.. The Initial Regulation of Pay-Per-Call Technology
The FCC first adopted regulations governing interstate pay-per-call
73. Harrington Statement, supra note 59, at 246.
74. See id.
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services75 in 1991 to address consumer complaints of widespread industry
76
abuse involving 900-number services. The fraudulent practices included
overbilling consumers, failing to disclose what service the consumer was
actually paying for, and threatening phone service disruption if the
consumer did not promptly pay the disputed phone charges. The telephone
industry's inability or unwillingness to provide adequate consumer
safeguards to its customers forced the FCC to enact these rules. Without
any substantive threat of repercussion, the industry was without the
motivation necessary to adequately address the abuses and insure that fraud
would no longer be permitted. These regulations were a result not only of
the numerous consumer complaints but also the increase of competitive
interactive services the industry offered.7 Increases in both competition
and technology induced some service providers to take suspect measures to
procure increased revenues.
The FCC specifically intended for the promulgation of these new
regulations to protect the consumer from the fraudulent and misleading
billing practices of 900-number and other pay-per-call services. The FCC
proposed numerous protective measures which included requiring pay-per-
call programs to begin with a preamble, disclosing in a clearly
understandable and audible voice the name of the information provider, the
cost of the services, and a brief description of the product.78 Pay-per-call
75. The term "pay-per-call services", commonly referred to as "900 services", is
defined at 47 U.S.C. § 228(i) (Supp. 111996) as any service:
(A) in which any person provides or purports to provide-
(i) audio information or audio entertainment produced or packaged by such
person;
(ii) access to simultaneous voice conversation services; or
(iii)any service, including the provision of a product, the charges for which
are assessed on the basis of the completion of the call;
03) for which the caller pays a per-call or per-time-interval charge that is greater
than, or in addition to, the charge for transmission of the call; and
(C) which is accessed through use of a 900 telephone number or other prefix or
area code designated by the [FTC].
In addition, the Commission may extend the definition to other similar services
providing audio information or audio entertainment if the Commission determines that such
services are susceptible to the unfair and deceptive practices that are prohibited by the rules
prescribed pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 5711 (1994). These services generally offer callers
recorded and interactive information and entertainment programs that carry charges in
excess of the charge for transmitting the call.
76. See Policies and Rules Concerning Interstate 900 Telecomms. Servs., Report and
Order, 6 F.C.C.R. 6166, para. 2, 69 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1360 (1991) [hereinafter 900
Telecomms. Servs. Report and Order].
77. See Policies and Rules Concerning Interstate 900 Telecomms. Servs., Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 6 F.C.C.R. 1857, para. 2 (1991).
78. See 900 Telecomms. Servs. Report and Order, 6 F.C.C.R. 6166, para. 92, 69 Rad.
Reg.2d (P & F) 1360.
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service providers and common carriers were to give callers an opportunity
to disconnect the call prior to incurring any charges.79 In addition, the
regulations required local exchange carriers (LECs) to offer telephone
subscribers the option of blocking access to pay-per-call services, either
through a 900 number or other designated FCC approved calling prefix. 'a
Furthermore, the FCC's regulations prohibited common carriers from
disconnecting basic telephone service for a customer's failure to pay pay-
per-call charges.8' The FCC was now holding pay-per-call service
providers and common carriers accountable for the once burgeoning
problem of misinforming and abusing their communications customers.
B. Further Efforts to Address the Pay-Per-Call Industry
1. The Telephone Disclosure and Dispute Resolution Act
On October 28, 1992, President Bush signed into law the Telephone
Disclosure and Dispute Resolution Act (TDDRA).82 The purported purpose
of the TDDRA was to "protect the public interest and the future
development of interstate pay-per-call... technology by providing for the
regulation and oversight of the applications and growth of the pay-per-call
industry." 3 This Act was in response to Congress's growing consideration
for protecting consumers in the increasingly sophisticated and
unintelligible sphere of complex telecommunications technology. The
TDDRA required the FCC to adopt stricter regulations pertaining to the
provision of interstate pay-per-call services.84 The FCC adopted new
regulations governing the role of common carriers in the provision of
interstate pay-per-call services. The FCC subsequently replaced its existing
pay-per-call rules's with a set of entirely new statutory regulations,
satisfying the congressional directive.
8 6
The most significant obstacle for the FCC was to adopt these new
79. See 47 C.r.R. § 64.711, repealed by Policies and Rules Implementing the Tel.
Disclosure and Dispute Resolution Act, Report and Order, 8 F.C.C.R. 6885,73 Rad. Reg.2d
(P & F) 790 (1993) [hereinafter TDDRA Report and Order].
80. See 47 C.F.R. § 64.713, amended by TDDRA Report and Order, 8 F.C.C.R. 6885,
paras. 55-63, 73 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 790 (current version 47 C.F.R. § 64.1508 (1998)).
81. See 47 C.F.R. § 64.714, amended by TDDRA Report and Order, 8 F.C.C.RI 6885,
paras. 49-54,73 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 790 (current version 47 C.F.R. § 64.1507 (1998)).
82. See Telephone Disclosure and Dispute Resolution Act § 201, 15 U.S.C. § 5711
(1994).
83. H.R. REP. No. 102-430, at 2 (1992).
84. See Telephone Disclosure and Dispute Resolution Act § 201.
85. These rules were codified at 47 C.F.R. §§ 64.709-64.716 (1998).
86. The new rules are codified at 47 C.F.R. §§ 64.1501-1515 (1998).
Number 2]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
regulations pursuant to the TDDRA in a manner that would maximize the
consumers' protection against pay-per-call service providers' unfair and
deceptive practices while ensuring a minimal disruption to common
carriers and other providers of lawful and legitimate pay-per-call services."
The new regulations provided several requirements that common carriers
must meet. First, common carriers and information providers must offer all
interstate pay-per-call services through telephone numbers on the 900-
service access code.8 Second, common carriers and information providers
cannot assess information service charges against callers to 800 and other
toll free numbers unless either those callers have established a pre-
subscription agreement with the information services provider or at the
time of the call the consumer executes a transaction through a credit or
charge card. S Third, common carriers carrying interstate pay-per-call
services must promptly terminate programs not in compliance with the
newly enacted federal law or regulations. Fourth, common carriers must
establish toll free pay-per-call information lines and provide pay-per-call
disclosure statements to all subscribers on an annual basis.9' Fifth, common
carriers must clearly separate pay-per-call charges from normal telephone
charges on subscriber bills92 and neither local nor long-distance telephone
service may be disconnected for a customer's failure to pay pay-per-call
charges.93 Finally, where technically feasible, common carriers must offer
telecommunications subscribers the option of blocking all access to
interstate pay-per-call services from their telephone lines. 4
These regulations provided the consumer with concrete protections
from the industry member's most common abusive tactics. Based on the
FCC's belief that with enough information the consumer could intelligently
choose whether or not to participate in the pay-per-call service, disclosure
became a focal point of the regulations. The FCC effectively protected the
consumer from several discrete fraudulent practices while causing only
minimal interruption to lawful pay-per-call service providers.
2. Section 228 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
Congress enacted section 228 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
87. See TDDRA Report and Order, 8 F.C.C.R. 6885, 73 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 790
(1993).
88. See 47 C.F.R. § 64.1506.
89. See id § 64.1504.
90. See id. § 64.1503.
91. See i § 64.1509.
92. See id. § 64.1510 (1998).
93. See id. § 64.1507 (1998).
94. See id § 64.1508 (1998).
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(1996 Act) "to put into effect a system of national regulation and review
that will oversee interstate pay-per-call services[] and to recognize the
[FCC]'s authority to prescribe regulations and enforcement procedures and
conduct oversight to afford reasonable protection to consumers of pay-per-
call services and to assure that violations of Federal law do not occur."
95
Congress's prior promulgation of the TDDRA had proven effective against
eliminating some specific abuses in the industry. However, with the
alleviation of some exploitation, some unscrupulous members of the
telecommunications industry promptly discovered new innovative methods
to defraud their unsuspecting customers. These service providers' new-
sprung method of deception involved exploitation of the 800-number and
other traditional toll-free prefixes.
The 1996 amendments to section 228 were to ensure that abuses
involving the use of toll-free numbers did not thwart the protective
measures Congress established through the TDDRA. 6 The 1996 Act's
amendments to section 228 "protects unsuspecting callers from being
charged for 800 calls that they expect to be toll-free."97 Pursuant to the
enactment of the 1996 Act, the FCC amended portions of its rules
governing interstate pay-per-call and other information services.9 The road
to the FCC's realization that restrictive guidelines were necessary to
effectively regulate the 900-number industry was fraught with novel forms
of fraud, abuse, and deception.
Given that the opportunity to self-regulate did not spell an end to the
abuses of the 900-number industry, the FCC responded after months of
wasted consumer resources and defrauded customers and finally
implemented strict industry-wide guidelines. The implementation of these
guidelines was not entirely successful as certain cunning industry
participants found ways around the new procedures. These innovations
were similarly met with even stricter guidelines that eventually
significantly alleviated the 900-number industry of fraud and once again
made it a useful and viable industry.
95. 47 U.S.C. § 228(a)(1)-(2) (Supp. I 1996).
96. See Policies and Rules Governing Interstate Pay-Per-Call and Other Info. Servs.
Pursuant to the Telecomms. Act of 1996, Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11
F.C.C.R. 14,738, para. 14, 3 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 953 (1996) [hereinafter Pay-Per-Call
Sers. Order].
97. S. REP. No. 104-230, at 202 (1996).
98. See Pay-Per-Call Servs. Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 14,738, para. 1, 3 Comm. Reg. (P & F)
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V. CONCLUSION: INDUSTRY SELF-REGULATION WILL NOT
WORK
If the Internet is to avoid a fate similar to that of the 900-number
industry, namely a marked decrease in consumer confidence and
participation, the FTC must address Internet fraud now. 9 Self-regulation,
whether of the 900-number industry or of the online auction industry, will
not be effective in preventing fraudulent users from abusing the consumer.
Not surprisingly, the online auction houses are strenuously arguing
for a laissez faire government approach, vigorously pursuing a self-
regulation standard. On utrade.com's fraud policy page, the site explicitiy
states, "[s]elf-regulation is the best prevention against fraud. We will make
every effort to enforce our fraud policy and we encourage our Auctions
Online community to join us ... If you don't complain, there exists a
possibility that we don't know. Let's all take a stand!"' °
In its comment to the FTC eBay states:
In the highly dynamic Internet marketplace... private firms such as
eBay are in the best position to design and implement creative
programs to respond to consumer complaints about fraud, deception[,]
and misuse. Therefore, both domestic and foreign government
agencies should resist the temptation to impose regulations on online
marketplaces and other forms of e-commerce in an effort to extend
consumer protection to this new form of commerce. Effective
consumer protection efforts are much more likely to emerge from
industry self-regulation.. .101
The problem with the industry's request for an opportunity to self-
regulate is inherent in its plea that it is best equipped to curtail online fraud.
The industry participants are either not the best suited to stymie the spread
of online auction fraud or they are incredibly slow to recognize the need for
action and take steps to implement their plans. The number of fraudulent
transactions associated with online auctions has grown from year to year
and continues to grow today.
The NCL stated that it applauds self-regulatory efforts such as the
BBBOnLine program and the codes of conduct developed by trade groups
such as the Direct Marketing Association because they encourage good
business conduct and reduce the potential for fraud and abuse.'02 "However,
self-regulatory schemes can never substitute for an appropriate legal
99. See Harrington Statement, supra note 59, at 246.
100. utrade.com, supra note 17.
101. eBay Comment, supra note 30.
102. See National Consumers League General Comments, FTC v. Hare, Civil Action No.
98-8194 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (visited Nov. 27, 1999) <http:llwww.fte.govlbcpicpwlcommentsl
neI.htm>.
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framework of consumer protection and redress because they are voluntary.
Not all businesses participate in them, and some participants fail to comply
with the standards that they have pledged to uphold.'
03
In order to handle the growing problem of online auction fraud
definitively, the FTC must come forth with a succinct legal framework to
guide the industry in its pursuit of fraud free transactions. The FTC should
mandate certain procedures that every online auction house must follow in
order to escape the potential for being liable if a fraudulent transaction
occurs.
First, the identity of every seller and buyer must be confirmed through
either Equifax or another similarly functioning credit agency. Rather than
encouraging sellers to undertake this certification for a fee, the auction
house should provide free-of-charge access to this validation process.
Consumer confidence in the validity of the auction will result in higher bids
and monies ultimately collected for the items entered in the auction. These
higher bids translate into higher commissions, which is perhaps the best
motivation for the online auction houses.
Second, the online auction house must require affirmative proof of
not only the purported existence of the merchandise, but also that the
quality of the good is the same as the seller claims. This authentication
process may even involve procedures as thorough as requiring the auction
house to establish localized holding houses where all auctioned
merchandise may be inspected prior to the commencement of the auction.
Third, the online auction house should provide free escrow service to
be channeled through the localized holding houses. If the auction house
implemented this service, a representative of the auction house would
oversee the transfer of the money for the auctioned merchandise. This
would ensure not only prompt delivery but also the winning bidder
receiving the goods for which they have paid.
Finally, the penalties against the online auction houses for providing a
place, albeit a place in cyberspace, where fraudulent actions are permitted
to occur must be swift and severe. The consumer can no longer be held to
the standard of caveat emptor in the arena of online auctions. By the very
nature of the business, there is never an opportunity to inspect the goods. It
would not be equitable to place such an onerous burden as caveat emptor
on the bidders when the auction houses are in a much better position to
insure the accuracy of the transaction.
Undoubtedly, there will be costs to all participants associated with the
auction houses' implementation of any of these safeguards. For some of the
103. ML
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measures, however, the cost will be offset by the higher prices generated by
the auction and delivered to the seller. The higher prices will be a direct
result of the increase in consumer confidence relating to the accuracy and
validity of the online auction process. As a result of higher bids, the online
auction houses will receive higher commissions from each successful
online auction.
Some of the suggested measures may ultimately prove cost
prohibitive for the online auction community to implement. If this is so, the
spirit of the suggested guidelines should prevail. Every participant should
undertake all necessary procedures to ensure the most complete
information about every other participant. Cooperation and communication
on every end will result in greater use of online auctions, an outcome sure
to please the online auction houses as well as the individual. Cooperation
begets currency.
No matter what the FTC ultimately decides to do, one thing is clear.
The final guidelines must place liability upon the online auction house
itself. The auction house is clearly in the best position to oversee and police
the entire auction community to which it plays host. Rather than chasing
the numerous fraudulent users and continuing to strain already too thin law
enforcement agencies, the most efficient and effective method to end online
auction fraud is to hold the hosts of the very place where the fraud occurs
liable for the actions of its users. Once liability has attached, the online
auction house will be quick to implement strict user policies in an effort to
end the very harm its Web site fosters.
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